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1. Globalization as process and as policy 
The word ' globalization' has been tortured and made to 
assume many different meanings since the time it was invented. At 
the risk of adding to the fragmentation in its connotation we can 
distinguish between two different generic classes of meanings 
attributed to it. One is the spread of human civilization, artefacts, 
institutions, patterns of living, information and knowledge to span 
the planet earth (and the stratosphere surrounding it). The other is 
a policy deliberately aimed at spreading certain institutions, modes 
of doing business, producing and trading commodities, services and 
information across all the states of the world. An analyst can trace 
the process of globalization in the various senses of the first generic 
class without accepting the agenda implicit in the second class. 
Following the usage of other analysts, we can distinguish the 
following subclasses included in 'globalization' in its analytical sense. 
First, there is a spread of international trade in goods and 
commodities' in the Marxian sense (the latter are distinguished by 
the fact that they are produced with the help of inputs traded in the 
market and are destined primarily for sale). Secondly, people 
migrate from one country or region to another, temporarily or 
permanently. Thirdly, money or means of payment are exchanged 
on an increasing scale between different countries or regions (when 
different regions within the same country have different media of 
exchange, as happened in India under British rule until the eve of the 
first World War). Fourthly, capital flows from one country to 
another to help produce goods and services. Fifthly, finance - not 
necessarily linked to the production of goods and services - flows 
between different countries. Sixthly, transnational companies arise 
which increasingly engage in the activities listed so far. Seventhly, 
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technology is traded as between different countries. Increasingly, 
with the spread of the patent regimes governed by the Paris 
Convention as modified by the provisions of the World Trade 
Organization, frontier technologies take an increasingly proprietary 
form. The eighth aspect of globalization is the spread of print and 
electronic media. The ninth aspect is the growth in international 
trade and production of services of all kinds - shipping, insurance, 
banking, healthcare and, of course, finance. As is clear from this list, 
the categories sometimes overlap, but if we do not list them 
separately we are likely to miss out on the multifaceted nature of 
globalization as a process. 
As in the case of other aspects of capitalist development 
globalization also displays many features of combined and unequal 
development. The growth of international trade may be said to be 
the earliest feature of the process of commercial internalization. It 
has, however, often been associated with an exchange of money at 
a fast pace, and also with migration of people. For example, in the 
three centuries after the Europeans' discovery of navigable routes 
from Europe to the western hemisphere and around Africa to Asia, 
commodities travelled mainly from Asia to Europe, silver from the 
Americas to Europe and thence to Asia, and enslaved Africans were 
subjected to forced migration from Africa to the Americas. Within 
Europe itself; before the Netherlands became industrialized enough 
to attain the status of a leading commodity-producing nation, it 
became the financier of European wars and the economic progress 
of competing nations, especially of England, and thereby helped 
hasten its own economic and political decline. We can produce a 
chronology of stages of globalization, from increasing 
commercialization of a basically self-sufEcient economy through its 
increasing involvement in international trade flows and attendant 
specialization in particular branches of production, to its 
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involvement in flows of portfolio and direct investment, to its 
integration m international production structures through an 
increasing tempo of exchange of inputs as between firms (often 
affiliates of the same firms), to the increasing domination of its 
production, exchange and banking structure by transnational non-
financial corporations and transnational banks, and finally to its 
entanglement in seemingly uncontrollable flows of finance across its 
borders (Bagchi, 1994). But this evolutionaiy sequence is neither 
linear nor inevitable nor irreversible. In the case of India and the 
international economy as a whole the flow of international trade had 
accelerated from the 1870s to 1913 and had decelerated from the 
middle of the 1920s (Bagchi, 1993). In India's case, however, the 
ratio of foreign trade to national income tended also to decline over 
the period from the 1950s to the early 1970s, but it increased slowly 
again from the late 1970s. 
The ebbs and flows in the components of different aspects of 
involvement of a national economy in international trade, production 
and finance are influenced strongly by broad developments in the 
international economy as well by domestic policies. For example, 
foreign trade was used from the beginning of British rule as the chief 
conveyor belt for the remittance of the tribute extracted from the 
Indian empire to Britain. But its importance as the transmission 
mechanism for the extracted tribute grew in the period of the spread 
of the gold standard to the major industrializing economies of the 
North Atlantic and the acceleration in the rates of growth of their 
national income and resulting demand for industrial inputs and 
primary commodities. Contrariwise, the worldwide depression in 
trade m agricultural products which set in from 1926 (i.e., some 
years before the Great Depression starting in 1929) badly affected 
Indian exports. Again, the rise in the ratio of Indian foreign trade to 
national income in the late 1970s was much less induced by policy 
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than by developments in the world economy and especially by the 
growth of demand for Indian exports in West Asia and some other 
oil-exporting regions. However, global recession in the early 1980s 
brought down the share again. In 1985-86, the share of India's 
exports to India's GDP was 4.7 per cent. The corresponding figure 
rose to 6 .8 per cent on the eve of the spate of liberalization measures 
adopted in June-July 1991. The share of exports to GDP rose to 
10.3 per cent in 1996-97, but has stagnated at around that level in 
the last two years, with a slowdown in the growth of both exports 
and national income. 
What then are the policies which have promoted the 
globalization of the Indian economy in its various aspects in recent 
years ? Virtually all the elements of the policy of economic 
liberalization which started in an attenuated form in 1985 but was 
adopted as an official policy stance from 1991 have promoted 
globalization of Indian capitalism in all its aspects. We devote the 
next section to a rapid sketch of these policy measures. 
2. A brief sketch of the socalled economic reforms in India 
since the 1980s and some of its results 
In India, partly as a legacy from the days of the second 
World War and partly as the outcome of moves to ration scarce 
resources and direct them to planned uses and to curb the power and 
the socially damaging behaviour of foreign capital and monopoly 
houses, a number of regulations sought to delimit the fields of 
operation of the private and the public sectors, allocate investment 
and finance, and control the inflow and outflow of foreign funds. 
From the late 1970s, however, some of these regulations were 
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relaxed and the foreign exchange value of the rupee was allowed to 
drift downward on a crawling-peg basis. In 1981 India obtained an 
Extended Funding Facility credit of SDR 5 billion from the IMF, but 
did not draw the last instalment of the loan and no major changes 
took place in the array of policies pursued by the government. 
However, in 1985 began a series of moves which essentially 
amounted to an expansive, debt-dependent fiscal policy directed at 
stimulating the growth of the economy (for a description of the 
policy changes see Datta, 1992; Bagchi, 1995, Section 5 and 
Nayyar, 1996, chapters 2 and 3). The changes effected in 1985 
covered all the major fields of regulation except the capital market. 
The rigour of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(1969) was considerably reduced, making it virtually irrelevant as far 
as the expansion of monopoly houses was concerned. The 
government encouraged foreign investment into many areas which 
had earlier been barred to the latter. It considerably liberalized the 
imports of capital goods and materials, especially of those needed 
for large projects in electricity generation, and in industries utilising 
natural gas and oil. Along with these moves, the burden of taxation 
on high-income and propertied groups was considerably lessened. 
The government resorted to higher and higher doses of deficit 
financing to defray its expenditures and this led to a rapid 
accumulation of internal, and even more ominously, external, debt. 
By the beginning of 1991, India was faced with the prospect of 
defaulting on her debt obligations and accordingly being unable to 
secure even short-term loans except on very onerous terms. In 
June-July 1991, in order to restore confidence among India's debtors 
and in the rupee, the government entered into an agreement with the 
IMF for a standby first-tranche credit of SDR551.93 million (about 
US $754 million) and drawings under the compensatory and 
contingency financing facility totalling the equivalent of SDR 1352 
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million (about US$1847 million). Later in the year, the IMF granted 
another standby credit authorizing drawings upto the equivalent of 
SDR1656 million (about US$2262 million) (International Monetary 
Fund, P r e s s Release No.91/64, 31 October 1991). ^ accordance 
with the memorandum of understanding reached with the IMF the 
government of India carried out a series of policy reforms. The 
rupee was devalued by about 24 per cent. Initially a dual exchange 
rate was introduced, a lower rate being obtainable by exporters tor 
their requirements. By the beginning of 1993, the currency was 
made convertible for current account transactions and the two rates 
were unified. Quantitative restrictions on imports were moderated 
or removed altogether, and import tariffs were brought down across 
the board Earlier restrictions on foreign investment were done 
away with and a Foreign Investment Promotion Board was set up m 
order to attract foreign capital. 
Internal deregulation accompanied these changes in the 
foreign trade and payments regime. Many of the industrial sectors 
which had been earlier reserved for public enterprises were now 
thrown open to the private sector as well. The government sold off 
large proportions of shares in public enterprises to private 
purchasers, including mutual funds and foreign financial institutions. 
The system under which firms had to seek permission of the 
government for establishing new enterprises above a certain size or 
investment above a certain limit was abolished, except for a specified 
group of industries. The provision under the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Practices Act imposing restrictions on investment and 
production on firms of groups with assets above Rs. one billion was 
abolished. . . . 
A degree of financial liberalization seeking to unify capital 
and money markets was also effected. Control over new capital 
issues was abolished. Banks were allowed to deal in shares by 
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setting up mutual funds. Foreign financial institutions were allowed 
to enter the stock market and buy up shares of Indian companies, 
subject to some mild restrictions. Banks were permitted to set their 
own rates for accepting deposits and lending money, but the central 
bank, of course, still has control over minimum cash reserves or 
rediscounting facilities and thus can influence the supply of base 
money and terms of lending. Lending to 'priority sectors' at 
preferential rates has been continued but de-emphasized in actual 
transactions by banks. The government has also tried, though not 
very successfully so far, to bring down subsidies to agriculture, by 
raising water rates for public irrigation facilities, electricity tariffs, 
and fertiliser prices. Subsidisation of phosphatic fertilisers has been 
discontinued with a strongly negative effect on their use. 
3. The Indian emperience compared with that of other 
countries of South Asia 
We have so far discussed the Indian situation in isolation from the 
other countries of South Asia. However, because of a long 
historical legacy, and continual interchange among the peoples of 
these countries, they share many characteristics, including policy-
induced but fragmented globalization. Among the South Asian 
countries the first serious policy package aimed at globalization was 
introduced in 1977 in Sri Lanka under the presidency of Junius 
Jayawardena. But several halting attempts at liberalization of the 
trade and investment regime were also made in Pakistan, attempts 
that were often stymied by unsustainable macroeconomic 
imbalances. In Bangladesh a more thorough going liberalization 
programme was introduced in the 1980s under the military regime 
and were continued by the democratic regimes that succeeded it. 
Given the background, it is useful to examine some country-
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specific indices of aspects of globalization mentioned earlier. 
The first set of such indices relates to the shares of exports 
and imports to GDP (Table 1). In many of the countries of South 
Asia these ratios were going up before the onset of the formal policy 
of globalisation as Tables 1 and 2 reveal. Sri Lanka, had historically 
a high ratio of foreign trade to its GDP, because of the importance 
of plantation crops such as tea, coffee and rubber in its economy. 
The ratio of exports and imports to GDP in South Asian economies 
remains much lower than in typical East and Southeast Asian 
economies. Moreover, except for the case of exports from 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal there is no strong time trend in 
foreign trade flows in these economies. In most of the cases, 
imports of merchandise were higher than exports to start with, and 
the absolute increases in imports have generally been higher than 
those in exports so that balance of payments deficits have continued 
to trouble them even after the process of liberalisation has proceeded 
for some time. The gap between exports and imports has been 
generally bridged by remittances from migrant workers, and foreign 
aid including foreign loans, supplemented in the case of Sri Lanka 
and India, by some inflows of foreign portfolio and direct 
investment. 
Not only is the overall share of trade in GDP lower and 
increasing more slowly than in the fast-growing economies of East 
and Southeast Asia. The share of developing Asia (countries east of 
Iran) as a whole in Asian trade also is generally lower than the share 
of East and South-Eastern Asia in that trade. In 1994, whereas the 
share of total exports of East and Southeast Asia, barring Japan, 
going to Japan and developing Asia (as defined above) was 54.6 per 
cent, that of total exports of south Asia going to the same group of 
countries was only 27.7 per cent. Correspondingly, while the share 
of developing Asia and Japan in the imports of East and Southeast 
9 
Asia was 58.4 per cent, the share of imports of South Asia coming 
from the same region was 33.4 per cent. (ADB, 1996, pp. 186-7). 
Moreover, intra-South Asian trade was also rather meagre in value 
: the share of exports of countries of South Asia going to one 
another was only 4.2 per cent in 1994, and the share the same 
countries had in the (Ibid.), thus south Asia did not gain much either 
from the dynamism of East and South-East Asian economies or from 
a thriving trade with one another. 
Coming to another index of an active globalisation process, 
viz., inflows and outflows of FDI, we note that these were also 
rather feeble in the South Asian region. Table 3 reproduces the 
figures of FDI inflows as given in UNCTAD, 1995. 
We have not reproduced the figures of FDI outflows because 
they are quite insignificant. It is difficult to discern any real time 
trend of FDI inflows into any economy except perhaps for India and 
Sri Lanka. But in their case also, they pale into insignificance 
compared with the inflows into say, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 
or Thailand. 
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Table 2 Nepal: annual averages of percentages of 
exports and imports to GDP, 1977-1995 
1979-80 to 1984-85 to 1990-91 to 
1983-84 1988-89 1994-95 
Exports 4.7 5.2 9.0 
Imports 16.4 18.1 24.8 
Source : Guru-Gharana and Shrestha, 1996, Table 4.1. 
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We now come to another aspect of globalization that we 
have examined earlier, viz., labour migration out of and into the 
South Asian countries. Internationally comparable, reliable figures 
of movements of labour within the subcontinent, for example, from 
Nepal and Bangladesh into India (or any reverse movement) are not 
available. Nor are the figures of total migration outside the 
subcontinent for recent years (the latest internationally comparable 
figures are available up to 1985 or 1986, as given in the studies 
assembled in Amjad, 1989). However, a substitute is available in the 
form of figures of workers' remittances for Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. (WB, 1995, gives zero as the figure of 
workers' remittances for Nepal, which must be factually untrue : this 
means that these figures are not officially collected). In Table 4 are 
tabulated the ratios of workers' remittances to the GDPs and exports 
of the South Asian countries. The Philippines, the country with 
perhaps the largest share of migrants in the labour force is also 
included. The figures indicate that in Bangladesh and Pakistan 
workers' remittances play an even bigger role in generating income 
and acting as supplements to export earnings than in the case of the 
Philippines, another major labour-exporting country of Asia. The 
character of migration from all the countries is not the same. 
Among the migrants, there is a considerably larger percentage of 
women going out of Sri Lanka than out of the other South Asian 
countries. From the Philippines also there is a large out-migration 
of women In both cases this is partly a reflection of the higher level 
of education of women than in most of the other labour-exporting 
lands but partly also the result of high levels of unemployment of 
women in both countries (see Table 5). Pakistan also has a high level 
of unemployment of women, but there the percentage of women in 
paid employment is rather low compared with the two other 
countries. 
14 
Table 4 : Workers' remittances (WR) as percentages of GDP 
and exports, South Asia and the Philippines, 1980-1993 
Country Year WR as a percent-
age o f GDP 
WR as a percent-
age of merchandise 
exports 
Philippines 1980 1.9 10.6 
1985 2.6 17.4 
1990 3.3 17.8 
1993 4.7 22.3 
Bangladesh 1980 2.2 36.1 
1985 4.0 50.2 
1990 3.7 46.6 
1993 4.2 44.1 
India 1980 1.6 32.7 
1985 1.1 25.6 
1990 0.7 12.4 
1993 1.2 13.4 
Pakistan 1980 8.9 82.1 
1985 8.7 97.2 
1990 5.5 40.4 
1993 3.3 23.7 
Sri Lanka 1980 3.5 13.1 
1985 3.9 17.7 
1990 4.6 19.9 
1993 5.4 19.3 
Source: ADB, 1996, p.207; and World Tables, 1995 (for estimates of the 
figures for India m 1993). 
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These figures of high unemployment among women, co-
existing with the reported feminisation of labour, especially in 
labour-intensive export-oriented industries such as garments in Fiji 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal reveal the contradictory impact of 
globalization on gender equity at low levels of economic 
development. On the one hand, the rapid penetration of market 
forces into rural areas and small towns often leads to the 
displacement of women engaged in subsistence activities in 
agriculture and in artisanal work such as handloom-weavmg or other 
craft-work On the other hand, if globalization is spearheaded by the 
growth of labour-intensive manufactures, then entrepreneurs bent on 
maximizing profits engage low-skilled, low-wage women's labour 
This leads not only to the feminization but in the presence of 
grinding poverty, the juvenization of labourer. In this situation, 
where education and cultural practices allow them to join the stream 
of migrants, migration overseas can provide a way of escape and a 
path to higher incomes for women. 
4. Towards financial liberalization in India : the illusion of 
security through securitization 
In India up to 1991, the banking system was closely 
regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (the central bank) and the 
Ministry of Finance, and the money and capital markets were 
segregated Banks were not allowed to hold shares of private firms 
as part of their statutory holding of liquid assets against their 
liabilities The Reserve Bank of India laid down two aggregate 
constraints on the operations of commercial banks. The first was the 
cash minimum ratio of cash to liabilities, (CRR), and the second was 
a legally stipulated minimum ratio of the value of approved securities 
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to the total liabilities of banks - the second liquidity ratio (SLR). 
There was also a distinction between the socalled term-lending 
institutions such as the Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
(IFCI), the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) and the 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) and 
the commercial banks, who were supposed to extend mainly short-
term credit. The rates of interest paid by banks on various classes 
of deposit and the rates of interest charged by them on different 
categories of loans were also specified. There was also a regulation 
that at least 40 per cent of the credit extended by the commercial 
banks would be given to the socalled priority sectors such as 
agriculture, small scale industry, transport operators and so on, at 
rates of interest which were lower than those charged to other 
borrowers. 
Issues of new capital through the stock market were also 
regulated by an official Controller of Capital Issues. Banks could 
act as underwriters of capital issues but would not hold equities as 
major assets : in any case that would tend to infringe the requirement 
of keeping a minimum SLR as officially stipulated. Foreign 
investors were not usually allowed to hold more than a small 
percentage of equity of an Indian company. 
In moves to deregulate the Indian economy most of the 
regulations, controls and devices of segregation between the money 
and capital markets, and between Indian and foreign investors were 
eased if not removed altogether. Banks were allowed to set their 
deposit rates and their lending rates within certain limits, the 
requirement of setting aside 40 per cent of the credit for priority 
sectors was eased, and because of the perception that reducing the 
fiscal deficit of the government would lead to lower borrowing 
requirements of the public sector, by 1997 the SLR was brought 
down from 38 to 25 per cent (RBI, 1997). The CRR was also 
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brought down to 10 per cent in a move to increase the liquidity of 
the banks in a regime of generally high interest rates. From May 
1992, foreign institutional investors were allowed to participants 
directly in the Indian stock market. Already in 1987, public sector 
banks (which means the major part of the banking sector since all 
major banks had been nationalized) had been allowed to set up 
mutual funds for subscribing to bonds and equities. Non-banking 
companies were allowed to mobilise funds through deposits and 
other schemes, and other non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) 
were permitted to operate in the capital and money markets. Banks 
and NBFCs were allowed to raise money through certificates of 
deposit in India and abroad (by means of the socalled global deposit 
receipts or GDRs). Under the neoliberal regime, money market 
mutual funds, - not necessarily linked to banks, - were allowed to be 
set up in the private sector as well. In order to allow companies to 
tap new sources of funds and potential investors everywhere access 
to profit-making opportunities, many new stock exchanges were set 
up, covering all major cities and regions. 
4.1 The logic of financial liberalization 
The rationale behind all these moves was partly allocation-oriented 
and partly oriented towards promotion of entrepreneurship and 
thrift. It was supposed that higher rates of interest on deposits with 
banks and other financial intermediaries would encourage people to 
save more. At the same time freedom to set rates of interest on the 
parts of banks and NBFCs would encourage competition and better 
allocation of the savings mobilized as between the capital and money 
market agents. The unification of capital and money markets was 
also aimed at on the same grounds of better allocation of resources 
and faster growth. Finally, the government of India had already 
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been offering attractive rates of interest to foreign and non-resident 
Indian depositors on foreign currency deposits. Their privileges 
were further strengthened, and in a bid to attract both foreign direct 
and portfolio investment, foreign investors were allowed to enter 
many sectors of the economy which had earlier on been closed to 
them, and they were allowed to hold progressively larger shares of 
equity in such firms. The current BJP-led central government has 
allowed foreigners to hold 100 per cent equity stake in most sectors 
of industry and services, including infrastructural facilities. A 
programme of progressive privatization of major public sector 
corporations such as the State Bank of India, Indian Oil 
Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Bharat Heavy 
Electricals was set in train. From 1992 foreign institutional investors 
were allowed to buy and sell shares in the market, and their 
permitted stakes have been hiked progressively over the years. In 
the USA and Britain, the unification of the money and capital 
markets already occurred in the 1980s. Large transnational clearing 
banks, merchant banks, and mutual funds had got used to operating 
in both money and capital markets on their own behalf and on behalf 
of their clients. It was supposed by policymakers that these banks 
and fund managers would find investing in the Indian money and 
stock markets if they were allowed to have the same freedom of 
operation in India as they enjoyed abroad. (In fact, the origins of the 
socalled ^bank scam' of 1991-92 can be traced back to 1987, from 
when some of the transnational banks abused the new facility 
extended to them of the right to manage portfolios of stocks and 
bonds for their assets, and the Reserve Bank of India authorities 
turned a blind eye to these abuses in order not to offend the potential 
foreign investors). 
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4.2 Reaping the harvest of badly regulated financial 
liberalization in India 
When the government of India adopted the step of abolishing official 
regulation of capital issues by companies, and indicated that further 
measures liberalizing industrial and financial regulation were in the 
offing, it started a boom in the stock market, and the share prices of 
many companies doubled and trebled within a few months. This 
share market boom collapsed around May 1992. It was revealed 
soon after that the boom had been fuelled by a small group of bull 
operators who had been financed mainly by a few foreign banks such 
as the Citibank, ANZ Grindlays Bank, Bank of America and major 
public sector banks such as the National Housing Bank and the Bank 
of Baroda, often in violation of the central bank regulations and 
prudential norms. A sum of at least Rs.5000 crores (Rs.50 billion) 
lent by the banks to brokers in the stock market remains 
unaccounted for even now. It is symptomatic that M.J. Pherwani, 
the then Chairman of the National Housing Bank, who had been a 
key player in the extension of the jurisdiction of the stock market 
(having recently chaired two high-powered committees relating to 
it, appointed by the Reserve Bank of India : Misra, 1997, p.353) 
died under suspicious circumstances as soon as the socalled 'bank 
scam' came into public view. The lesson of this bit of history is that 
if government regulation breeds corruption, so does the operation 
of private interests. Only an official watchdog with sufficiently 
strong penal powers can check the worst abuses committed by 
unscrupulous dealers and bankers. 
After the revelation of the 'bank scam', the Government of 
India decided to endow the Securities and Exchange Board of India, 
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which had been established in 1988, with some real powers of 
monitoring and regulation of stock markets. The history of the 
operation of the Indian stock market has nevertheless been dotted 
with brokers often unable to meet their commitments, allegations 
and proved instances of insider trading, and deliberate manipulation 
of stock prices by bears and bulls. Stock prices have gone through 
several incidents of booms and troughs, the biggest boom having 
occurred between 1993-94 and 1994-95. (Table 6) But since then, 
with some fluctuations from time to time, the share prices have been 
on a downgrade, and 1998 has witnessed new troughs reached by 
the share market. 
The value of primary capital issues in the stock market has 
also followed a zigzag course, as revealed by Table 7. From 1991 
to the middle of 1993, India passed through an industrial recession, 
and then industrial growth picked up from 1993 to 1996, but from 
1996 industrial growth rates declined again. Some of the 
acceleration of industrial growth from 1993 was a reaction to 
recession and inventory depletion in the earlier two years, but some 
was caused by the continued tariff protection afforded to major 
consumer durables and transport industries, such as cars and motor 
cycles, trucks, and so on; some growth was also caused by the rapid 
diffusion of information technology users among the affluent 
sections of the middle class. A larger inflow of foreign funds and a 
good monsoons sustaining agricultural production both boosted 
growth during those three years and helped moderate inflation. 
There was also a higher rate of growth of exports, helped by the 
devaluation of the Indian rupee and a strong growth in world trade. 
However, once these factors were exhausted, growth faltered, and 
from 1997 India entered into a renewed phase of slowdown in 
industrial growth, which has turned into a recession in 1998. These 
developments have been exacerbated by the Asian economic crisis 
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starting in Thailand in July-August 1997, and spreading to South 
Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia later. The latest major victim of the 
global slump and turmoil in foreign exchange markets has been 
Russia which in effect suspended the servicing of its foreign debt in 
September 1998. 
4.3 The international turmoil in stock markets and the irony 
of external debt burdens 
All these developments have had their impact on stock 
markets across the world and in India. The market for primary 
security floatation has virtually collapsed in India as Table 7 
indicates clearly. The prices of stocks all across the world have been 
hammered. According to the Economist, 5 September 1998, almost 
US$ 4 trillion had been wiped off the total value of share prices 
across the world in the preceding two months - a sum equivalent to 
the GDP of Japan, the second largest economy of the world. 
According to estimates published in HDR, 1998 (Table 20), the total 
value of the external debt of the developing countries in 1995 was 
US$1,583 billions. 
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Table 6 Index numbers of prices of industrial securities, averages of weeks 
ended Saturday, India, 1990-91 to 1996-97 (Bose : 1981-82 = 100) 
Bombay Stock Exchange 
Sensitive index (Sensex) 
Index numbers of ordinary share prices 
1990-91 500.3 
1991-92 776.2 
1992-93 1142.3 
1993-94 1051.3 
1994-95 1537.3 
1995-96 1189.6 
1996-97 1146.8 3469 
1997-98 1061.0 3813 
June 1997 1069.1 4001 
March 1998 N.A. 3817 
13 October 1998 N.A. 2832.03 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India : Reports on Currency Finance from 1991-92 
to 1996-97 (Mumbai); Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 1997-98 (Mumbai, 
1998); Business Standard (Calcutta), 14 October 1998. 
Table 7 New capital issues by non-government 
public limited companies in India 1991-98 
No. of issues Amount (Rs. billion) 
1991-92 514 61.93 
1992-93 1040 198.03 
1993-94 1133 193.30 
1994-95 1678 264.17 
1995-96 1677 161.72 
1996-97 851 104.57 
1997-98 102 31.38 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India; Report on Currency and 
Finance, 1996-97, Vol.n (Mumbai, 1997), Statement 127; Reserve 
Bank of India : Annual Report 1997-98 (Mumbai, 1998), Appendix 
Table V.8. 
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According to the same Report (Table 37), the total external debt of 
Eastern Europe and the CIS was US$263,861 billion in 1995, of 
which the debt of the Russian Federation was US$120,461 billion. 
According to press reports, the latter figure had gone up to $150 
billion on the eve of the suspension of the debt servicing by Russia 
in 1998. Assuming a similar rate of growth of external debt for 
other Eastern European countries, the total external debt of all those 
countries in 1998 would come to about US$330 billion; a similar 
assumption would bring up the debt of the developing countries to 
1980 the total external debt of all the developing countries and 
Eastern Europe (including Russia) would be US$2410 billion. Thus 
the loss in global share value alone would have more than 
compensated for the total value of the external debt of all the major 
indebted countries. The outstanding external debt of the Latin 
American countries and of the Asian economies in trouble from 
1997 had been one of the chief contributory factors to the Mexican 
crisis of 1995 and the crisis of the East and Southeastern economies 
(Bagchi, 1998). Yet the watchdogs of the financial world, such as 
the IMF and the World Bank and the leaders of and G7 countries did 
not dare to write off any significant part of the debt of the heavily 
indebted countries, for in their view, this would have undermined the 
very integrity of private ownership and hence of the global capitalist 
order. 
5. Managing volatile markets in India 
What happened in other major stock markets in the world 
had its parallel and its impact on the Indian stock market as well. As 
we mentioned earlier, the industrial slowdown started in 1996-97 the 
official index of industrial production grew only by 6.4 per cent in 
that year compared with a growth of 12.5 per cent in 1995-96; in 
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1997-98, the index grew only by 5.7 per cent (GOI, 1998, Table 
1.2). This slowdown squeezed the profitability of many industrial 
companies whose shares were traded on the stock market, and 
increased the value of non-performing assets of banks. Moreover, 
because of the current-account convertibility of the rupee and the 
increasing penetration of Indian stock markets by foreign financial 
institutions (FFIs) looking for higher profits, the foreign exchange 
market, the share market and the market for government securities 
became much more closely interlinked than ever before (RBI, 1998; 
pp. 76-7): 
In response to external shocks arising from the 
South-East Asian crisis and in recognition of the 
interlinkages, a series of monetary policy measures 
were undertaken impinging on liquidity, foreign 
exchange and money market rates.... During the first 
quarter (April-June 1997), excess supply conditions 
existed in the forex market, and inter-bank call 
money rates were low. Liquidity was abundant and 
the Reserve Bank sold government securities to 
absorb liquidity through open market operations. 
Outstanding amounts of repos [ i.e., government 
securities deposited with the Reserve Bank by banks 
and other approved organizations for short periods 
on condition that they would buy them back - A.B.] 
were also high. The first two months of the second 
quarter of the year reflected more or less the same 
trends. However, there was noticeable depreciation 
of the rupee in September 1997 ... and also, some 
sales of foreign currencies by the Reserve Bank. 
Reflecting the resulting liquidity drain, the average 
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outstanding repos stood low and the reverse repos 
outstanding increased sharply, the turnover in the call money 
market too showed a decline. In the third quarter, the months 
of November and December again witnessed pressures 
developing in the exchange markets with the FEDAI [i.e., 
Foreign Exchange Dealers' Association of India] indicative 
rates depreciating sharply against the US dollar. Foreign 
currency sales were marked in these months, the liquidity 
effects of which were partially offset by reverse repo 
operations The turnover in the call money market during 
these two months was also lower than that in the month of 
October 1997 In Januaiy 1998 the foreign exchange market 
again came under severe pressure, necessitating the Reserve 
Bank to undertake strong monetary policy measures leading 
to a sharp withdrawal of liquidity and increase in interest 
rates As a consequence, call rates increased sharply, and in 
line with the development, the turnover in the money market 
recorded a further decline. As offsetting measures, foreign 
currency purchases were undertaken together with reverse 
repo operations. The impact of monetary management was 
such that in February orderly conditions were restored in the 
forex market and liquidity showed an improvement.... 
I have deliberately given a long quotation from the Annual 
Report of the Reserve Bank of India in order to show the yo-yo 
movements and the necessity for constant intervention m the forex 
e x c h a n g e a n d money markets that have been caused by the linking 
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of the domestic money and capital markets with foreign exchange 
markets and the instability in the currency markets in recent times. 
The Indian monetary authorities have so far managed to prevent a 
sudden devaluation of the rupee and extreme degrees of turmoil of the 
value of the rupee in the foreign currency markets. But they have 
done so by resorting to a generally high-interest regime, and 
preventing transfers of capital abroad except through certain 
permitted channels. But the relative stability in the external value of 
the rupee against the background of the Asian currency crisis has been 
associated with a huge depreciation in the Indian stock prices and has 
required deliberate action to prevent the collapse of India's oldest and 
largest, government-controlled mutual fond, the Unit Trust of India. 
6. Is there a distinction between fully integrated money and 
stock markets and a casino ? 
Fervent believers in the unification of the capital and money 
markets and deregulation of all prices and quantities in the financial 
markets have been victims of fallacious reasoning with grave 
implications for the financial stability of the who le world, including, 
of course, India as well. The reasoning contains a number of fallacies 
which bunched together, would explain all the troubles the world 
economy has undergone under the unregulated capitalist dispensation 
"The stock market's too risky — 
I'd feel safer going to Las Vegas 
and putting n on red." 
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since 1973, and especially since the onset of financial liberalization in 
the era of Reagan and Thatcher, and their mimetic successors. The 
first and fundamental fallacy is a confusion between equality of pnces 
of goods and services, and of rates of all assets as a consistency 
relation in a state of equilibrium as defined by neoclassical economists 
and the possibility of achievement of that equality through a regime of 
unbridled competition. The fallacy is best seen in the operation of 
markets for liquid assets and was brought out clearly by John 
Maynard Keynes in Chapter 12, T h e state of long-term expectation', 
in his classic on the theory of involuntary unemployment in a capitalist 
economy (Keynes, 1936). In a market for liquid assets, if every 
person correctly expects the rate of return to be higher than that of 
some other asset, then nobody will hold the second asset, and prices 
of assets will fluctuate violently. If, on the other hand, the relative 
prices of different assets happen to be such that everybody is 
indifferent as to the holding of any two assets, then the allocation 
becomes absolutely fixed or indeterminate, and the competitive 
mechanism ceases to operate as a signalling mechanism for changing 
the portfolio mix. 
Thus determinate allocation of assets requires that different 
persons should hold different beliefs about the way the rates of return 
on different assets will change. This is the mechanism by which, for 
example, at any moment the margins between bonds and equities, or 
expected rates of return of those two classes of assets, or between 
equities of different companies are determined. This difference in 
expectation of different investors, and their hopes of making a profit 
out of utilizing their knowledge of what they believe to be the correct 
state of nature is what drives the speculative motive, as Richard Kahn 
brought out in a classic article a longtime back (Kahn, 1954/1972). 
However, states of nature in asset markets are not simply the 
world of objects, physical assets and their true productive powers. 
The theorists who want to reduce all uncertainty to an actuarial 
expectation commit two related fallacies even in conceptualizing how 
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such "objective facts' are translated into expected values. First, they 
assume that individuals make correct calculations of the actuarial 
values, given the probability distribution of the relevant states of 
nature. But people in fact make systematic mistakes in this regard 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Secondly, the neoclassical finance 
theorists assume that if people know something to be against their 
self-interest, they will avoid it. However, faced with known risks, for 
example, of accident in their place of work such as the threat of 
nuclear radiation, many workers have been found to display what has 
been called 'cognition dissonance' and fail to take well-tried 
precautions (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982). Many investors behave 
very similarly when faced with the prospect of loss in the securities 
market. 
Apart from these faulty judgments about the state of nature, 
the market for securities has the peculiar characteristic that people's 
beliefs and judgments enter vitally into the determination of returns. 
An investor may believe correctly, let us say, that a company set up 
to exploit the Himalayan snow for irrigating the desert in the 
northwest of the Indian subcontinent will be very profitable after the 
next two years. But if all the other investors and the bankers of the 
company hold opposite beliefs, then the lone investor with confidence 
in its future will come a cropper if he does not sell out his shares while 
the going is good, because the company will go bust owing to the lack 
of confidence of other investors. The lone investor will not be able to 
use his correct belief for the benefit of himself or the community 
unless he happens to be in the multi-billionaire class, or he can get 
other backers who share his own beliefs. (Of course, if he is a multi-
billionaire he may persuade other people to his point of view even if 
he happens to be wrong !). 
Another fallacy propagated by adherents of the neoclassical 
theory of the firm and the valuation and control of the firm through 
the agency of the stock market is that the latter throws up the true 
value' of the. firm through competition between investors. If the 
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managers of the firm use the assets of the firm inefficiently and do not 
reward the equity-holders in accordance with the true returns 
obtainable from those assets, then the firm would be taken over by 
competitive bidders. By operating in this way the stock market will 
also bring about the optimal behaviour of the agents (namely, the 
managers) and minimize their tendency to neglect the interests of the 
principals, that is, the owners or shareholders of the firm (Manne, 
1965; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, this theory falls foul of 
the fact, which was pointed out a long time back by Keynes, that if 
there are some investors who hope to gain simply by bidding for and 
holding the shares of the taken-over firm for a short time, and then 
selling them, the market will not reveal the 'true value' of the firm. All 
that will happen when a market for corporate control develops is that 
the managers will be more interested in defending themselves, or 
benefiting from, the activities of raiders than in looking after the long-
term growth of the productivity of the firm. Moreover, relations 
between sellers and buyers, lenders and borrowers, or principals and 
agents are necessarily fraught with the asymmetric distribution of 
information between the players on the two sides of the bargain. 
Security markets suffer as much from such problems of asymmetric 
and incomplete information as the market for credit (Gertler, 1988). 
Once these basic peculiarities of the market for securities are 
grasped, it becomes easy to understand why financial markets should 
be subject to herd behaviour of investors, speculative attacks by bulls 
and bears, contagion effects of rumours, and sudden panics caused, let 
us say, by investigations into the sexual behaviour of an American 
President. Thus security markets can be expected to be volatile. The 
more the behaviour of firms is constrained by the way speculators and 
raiders, or even ordinary investors behaving like a herd operate, the 
more the course of real investment simulates the operatiomof a casino, 
as Keynes pointed out more than six decades^ bacfe To call a 
financially liberalized world, 'casino capitalism' (Strange, 1989) 
sounds then tautologous for capitalism itself becomes a giant casino. 
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Given the above proclivities of securitized markets, the 
' spreading of risks' and its minimization viewed from the vantage 
point of an individual profit-seeker becomes transformed into the 
spread of risks and uncertainty throughout the system : the invisible 
hand bringing about order changes into a hand wreaking mayhem and 
disorder. 
The disorderliness of the stock market does not, of course, 
remain confined to itself but has its impact on the real economy, 
especially if the securitized firms are major foci of investment. Fall in 
asset values of firms through a contraction in share prices makes 
them less attractive as loci of investment, and the credit channels of 
firms become constricted. The contraction in real investment leads to 
a fall in income and rise in unemployment; the fall in the prices of 
assets and debts leads to a contraction in the borrowing capacity of 
bankers and lending capacity of financial institutions (Fisher, 1933; 
Bernanke, 1983; Bagchi 1996) and acts as a depressor of the system 
and adversely affects expectations of an upturn in business confidence. 
Advocates of financial liberalization tend to believe that linking 
up local asset markets with foreign stock markets through the opening 
up of the local capital and money markets to foreign operators and the 
reciprocal permission granted to domestic investors to operate in 
foreign financial markets (including currency markets) allows the 
further spreading of risks and accrual of gains to everybody through 
competition and arbitrage leading to equalization of rates of return, 
adjusted for the risk of changes in exchange rates. New opportunities 
of arbitrage attracted many European and American pension funds 
and other financial institutions to Asian stock and currency markets, 
and the Indian stock markets as well. Exploitation of these 
opportunities by foreign investors has failed to bridge the enormous 
differences in interest rates or real rates of return as between, say, 
London, New York, Tokyo and Frankfurt, on the one hand, and 
Jakarta, Karachi, Mumbai and Lagos on the other. If interest rates 
corrected for exchange risk fail to be equalized internationally, there 
is even less evidence of any tendency towards convergence of per 
capita incomes as between developed and less developed countries 
(UNCTAD, 1997). Putting everything into the casino of an 
internationally unified stockmarket can only create instability without 
bringing about equality of asset returns, let alone per capita incomes. 
Even in periods of relative financial stability, the process of 
convergence of rates of return or incomes per capita among the 
regions of the most financially and economically developed countries 
has been found to be much stronger than internationally. One reason 
for this is that within a single country, say, the USA or Canada, the 
state can, through fiscal redistribution, try and equalize infrastructural 
facilities and income support measures between different regions 
(Atkeson and Bayoumi, 1993; Bayoumi and Masson, 1994; Bayoumi 
and Klein, 1995; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Box 5.2). But such 
redistributive measures are conspicuous by their absence in the 
international arena. 
The availability of fiscal measures by governments nationally 
but lack of such measures internationally stands as a strong reason 
against the full integration of national and international financial 
markets. Furthermore, a national government, can try and redistribute 
debts and credits (in a bid, for example, to restore the financial health 
of banks with large proportions of non-performing assets) by 
discriminating between different categories of domestic borrowers and 
creditors. However, under current international law, and the 
increasingly forceful use of the provisions of the World Trade 
Organization, it cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign 
operators in the economy. Moreover, under the convention of 
clubbing, virtually all debts owed to foreigners is treated as the 
sovereign debt owed by the government of the country, external debt 
has a higher priority for settlement than domestic debt. Even if this 
convention had not acquired the status of a legal norm, governments 
which have permitted the accumulation of external debt through the 
operation of a liberalized financial market have felt compelled to 
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honour even those debts which did not carry a public guarantee : the 
cases of Chile and the Philippines in the 1980s are two outstanding 
examples of inclusion of all external debts under the umbrella of the 
sovereign debt. 
7. The recent Indian experience with equity markets and the 
desperate attempt of the liberalizers to introduce capital 
account convertibility 
After six years of experience with the liberalized regime, the 
Reserve Bank of India, on 28 February 1997 appointed a committee 
'with a view to examining the various issues relating to capital 
account convertibility' (CAC, 1997, Annexure I). The committee 
consisted of three bankers, and two economists, who were both 
known supporters of the policy of liberalization : thus there was very 
little scope for the committee to seriously examine the arguments for 
keeping controls on capital account convertibility (CAC). The report 
of the committee was submitted within a remarkably short period, on 
30 May 1997 (that is, within a period of three months). The 
committee's examination of the experience of developing countries 
with capital account convertibility was extraordinarily superficial. It 
was confined to the period of the 1990s and skated over many 
episodes in Latin America and elsewhere in which such countries as 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile had introduced CAC already in the 1970s 
and had then had to suspend it because of unsustainable balance of 
payments deficits, capital flight and so on. The report contained no 
analysis of such experiences. It even failed to draw the right lessons 
from the mediocre growth record of such countries as the Philippines 
and Mexico which had introduced CAC. The committee laid down 
certain preconditions for the introduction of CAC in India, but failed 
to prioritize them properly. It concluded for example, that 
'strengthening of the financial system' and not ' a strong balance of 
payments position' is the most important precondition for CAC (CAC, 
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1997, p. 130). An examination of the East and Southeast countries 
revealed, however, that only regions or countries such as Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China which have been able 
to maintain a strong balance of payments position have so far escaped 
the need to appeal to the IMF to ease them out of their difficulties. 
Moreover, Taiwan, China and indirectly Hong Kong also have 
maintained various controls over inflows and outflows of capital from 
their respective territories (Bagchi, 1998). 
Despite some recognition on the part of the Committee that 
the preconditions for attainment of CAC had not been fulfilled in 
India, it recommended that ^the implementation of the CAC be spread 
over ' a three-year period 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000' (CAC, 
1997, p. 131), while these preconditions are attained. This reasoning 
is fallacious on several counts of which only two will be mentioned. 
First, India's record in bringing down the balance of payments and 
fiscal deficits during the liberalization period has been extremely 
mixed so far. The policy stance of the government is to minimize the 
taxes on the rich while enriching them further and hence there is little 
prospect of achieving a fiscal or macroeconomic balance through its 
policies. Given the state of the world economy since 1997 there is 
little prospect also of a turnaround in the export performance and 
hence of attaining a balance of payments surplus for India. Secondly, 
suppose India manages to attain better indices of performance in its 
balance of payments, in its budgetary balances, its rate of inflation 
(which has gone up again) and in its growth rate. With CAC, all the 
indices can tumble down when an international financial panic occurs, 
or when, for some reason, the international financial community 
regards India's prospects with a jaundiced eye. 
We have earlier noticed the gymnastics the Reserve Bank of 
India has had to perform in order to keep order in the markets for 
foreign exchange, government securities and credit, in the wake of the 
Asian currency crisis. Many of the same neo-liberals who had been 
baying for CAC are now patting themselves on the back for keeping 
control on capital movements and hence avoiding the kind of 
predicament Thailand, Indonesia or South Korea got into. However, 
some of them have not given up. The chairman of the committee on 
CAC, for example, recently chided Indian policy analysts for giving up 
the idea of making the Indian rupee convertible in the near future 
(Tarapore, 1998). 
We will end this section by examining the idea, in the Indian 
context, that securitization and unification of financial markets can 
deliver greater security for investors. The largest and oldest Indian 
mutual fund is the Unit Trust of India (UTI) whose total investments 
grew from Rs.213.75 billion on 30 June 1992 (that is, one year after 
the onset of economic reforms) to Rs.487.24 billion on 30 June 1997 
(RBI, 1993a, p.318; RBI, 19977a, p. 131). With the lifting of ceilings 
on new capital issues by firms and on interest rates paid to depositors 
or charged to creditors, the UTI invested increasingly in equities 
rather than fixed-interest debentures. The share of equities in its total 
investment rose from 27.8 per cent on 30 June 1992 to 48.9 per cent 
in 30 June 1997. As we have seen, however, share values went on a 
downward slide again from 1997, and this made it increasingly 
difficult to keep up the redemption value of its leading scheme for 
small investors, viz., US-64 and fears were expressed about the ability 
of UTI to continue redeeming them except at much-depreciated 
prices. In the US-64 scheme itself the share of equities had increased 
from 65.7 per cent on 30 June 1998 to 68 per cent on 30 June 1998 
(BS, 1998). Between June and September 1998, the values of the 
shares of India's leading companies such as Reliance, TELCO, ITC, 
L&T, and so on declined by very large percentages - in some cases by 
over 60 per cent. When the news of UTI's portfolio was publicised in 
the papers, share prices went into a tailspin, partly because of general 
panic, and partly because a foreign institutional investor offloaded 
shares on a large scale (BS, 1998a). In fact, it is suspected that bear 
runs on the Indian stock market have been increasingly led by foreign 
institutional investors. 
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Ultimately, the rush for redemption of US-64 paper and the 
general slide in stock prices had to be contained by pledging the 
support of the government and the public sector banks (which 
dominate the money market) behind the UTI (Telegraph, 1998). Thus 
ironically enough, the damage caused by thoughtless securitization 
and linking up with foreign financial agencies could be contained only 
through state action, and not through the wizardry of alchemists of 
finance. How long and to what extent, an enfeebled state in a 
liberalized regime can continue to act as a fire-fighter remains a moot 
question in India as elsewhere. 
Acknowledgement: Non-incriminating thanks are due to Professor 
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